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INTERPRETATION OF "JOINT EMPLOYER" UNDER THE
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT-NINTH CIRCUIT
HOLDS AN AIRLINE THAT CONTRACTED WITH
GROUNDS CREWS IS NOT A "JOINT EMPLOYER"
OF THOSE WORKERS UNDER THE FMLA:
MOREAU V. AIR FRANCE
JENNIFER C. WANG*

C

ONGRESS PASSED THE Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA") in 1993 to help American workers "balance the
demands of the workplace with the needs of families."' To that
end, the FMLA entitled workers to take up to twelve weeks of
unpaid leave each year for medical reasons, such as the birth of
a child, or to provide care for a child, spouse or parent with a
serious health condition.2 But Congress limited the impact of
this entitlement on small businesses by excluding employers
with fewer than fifty workers within a seventy-five-mile area:
Then Congress borrowed terms of employment from the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), including the concept of 'joint
employers," to define which employers or employees would fall
within the scope of the FMLA.' With no FMLA case law on the
issue of 'joint employment" for guidance, 5 the Ninth Circuit re*

B.A., Southern Methodist University; M.S. Columbia University Graduate

School of Journalism; J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law (May 2006).
Ms. Wang wishes to thank her family for giving her "leave" to pursue her new
career in law.
I Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2000).
2 Id. § 2612.
3 Id. §2611(2) (B) (ii).

4 See Id. §2611(3); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.105(a) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.106
(2004).
The court noted correctly at the time that "[t]here are no reported cases in
this circuit (or any other for that matter) addressing joint employment in the
FMLA context." But the Eleventh Circuit has since touched upon the issue in
Morrison v. Magic Carpet Aviation, 383 F.3d. 1253 (11th Cir. 2004).

Also, the

Tenth Circuit has since addressed the definition of "worksite" for a joint employer under the FM[.A, but did not directly reach the issue ofjoint employment
in Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc., 391 F.3d. 1140 (10th Cir. 2004).
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cently borrowed analysis from FLSA cases to hold that an airline
that contracted out for grounds crew services is not a 'joint employer" of those workers and, therefore, does not have enough
employees to subject itself to the requirements of the FMLA.6
However, in drawing its conclusion that the airline is not a joint
employer, the court overlooked distinctions between the types
ofjoint employers identified by the FMLA,7 which are not mentioned by the FLSA. The court should not have relied on analysis from FLSA cases and, instead, should have analyzed the case
using the FMLA's descriptions of "primary" and "secondary"
employers.
Aside from raising new legal issues, Moreau v. Air France
presented facts distinct from all other cases analyzing joint-employment relationships. Such disputes typically hinged on
whether the plaintiff-worker qualified for leave as an employee
through a joint-employment relationship. 8 In Air France, however, the airline did not dispute that it directly employed plaintiff Stephane Moreau - an assistant station manager at the San
Francisco International Airport who had been on Air France's
payrolls for nearly eleven years prior to his termination.9 At issue was whether Air France indirectly employed enough other
workers at the San Francisco airport to put the airline within the
scope of the FMLA, which requires covered employers to provide reasonable medical leave to employees like Moreau." °
In March 1998, Moreau requested a twelve-week leave of absence in order to care for his ailing father in France. 1 ' Air
France's Director of Personnel in New York City denied his request, and later stated in writing that the airline was not required to provide medical leave under the FMLA because it
employed fewer than fifty employees within a seventy-five-mile
radius of the San Francisco Airport where Moreau was stationed. 2 When Moreau took leave anyway, Air France termiMoreau v. Air Fr., 356 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004).
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.106(c)-(e).
8 See, e.g., Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir
1983); Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1997).
9 Air Fr., 356 F.3d at 944, 953.
10 Id. at 944. Moreau also brought a parallel claim under the California Family
Rights Act ("CFRA"), but because the parties and the Court agreed that the
CFRA is substantially identical to the FM[A, the Court addressed only the federal
law.
InId. at 944.
12 Id. at 945.
6
7
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nated him.'" Moreau's subsequent lawsuit claimed that Air
France violated the FMLA because the airline had the requisite
number of employees at the San Francisco airport. 4 Moreau
asserted that, in addition to the approximately forty-two employees claimed by Air France in San Francisco,' 5 the airline also
'jointly" employed grounds crew workers contracted through
three different companies to provide such services as aircraft
towing, cleaning, food preparation and baggage and cargo handling. 6 While the parties disputed the characterization of Air
France's relationship to the crews, the court found some common ground. 7 All three crews worked simultaneously for other
airlines, but some employees of the cargo crew were, by contract, dedicated exclusively to Air France.1 8 Air France set strict
performance standards for all three crews, regularly inspected
the work done and occasionally trained the workers.' 9
Moreau first filed suit in federal court in the Northern District

of California in October

1999.2o

Air France moved for summary

judgment on the ground that it did not jointly employ the
grounds crew workers, and the district court granted the motion
in March 2002.21 Upon appeal by Moreau, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. 22 The Ninth Circuit noted in its analysis
that no reported cases addressed the issue of joint employment
in the FMLA context. 23 So the court applied the same analysis it
had previously used in cases involving the FLSA and the Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWAPA").24
The court considered these cases "informative" because the
FMLA's language on joint employment echoed the wording of
13 Id.

Id.
15 The Court stated in Footnote 7 of its opinion that, even when all facts are
construed in Moreau's favor, Air France employed a maximum of forty-two people in San Francisco at the time he requested leave. Id. at 953.
16 Id. at 948.
17 See id. at 948-50.
14 See

18 Id.
19 Id.

Moreau v. Air Fr., No. C-99-4645, 2002 WL 500779, at *8 (N.D. Cal. March
22, 2002).
21 Id. at *2, *10.
22 Air Fr., 356 F.3d at 953.
23 Id. at 946; see also supra text accompanying note 5.
24 Air Fr., 356 F.3d at 946, 947 n.
20
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joint employment regulations found in these other two federal
statutes.25
In Concluding that Air France was not ajoint employer of the
grounds crew workers, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon
analysis from its prior FLSA and AWPA decisions in Bonnette v.
CaliforniaHealth & Welfare Agency and Torres-Lopez v. May.26 Bonnette held that California agencies did jointly employ domestic
workers providing care to Social Security welfare recipients, entitling the domestic workers to minimum-wage compensation
under the FLSA.27 In Bonnette, the state and county agencies
paid elderly, blind and disabled welfare recipients money to
"purchase" domestic services. 2' The welfare recipients could use
the money to hire anyone they chose to help them with household "chores," but the agencies paid the domestic workers a predetermined rate that often did not match the prevailing federal
minimum wage. 2 ' For the domestic workers to qualify for minimum wage under the FLSA, the court had to find that they were
jointly employed by the welfare recipient and the state agencies.30 The Ninth Circuit held in Bonnette that a determination
of joint employment must be based "on a consideration of the
total employment situation and the economic realities of the
work relationship." 1 The court laid out four relevant factors:
whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire
the employees; (2) supervised and controlled employee work
schedules or conditions of employment; (3) determined the
rate and method of payment and (4) maintained employment
records.3 2 The Bonnette court found that, even though the agencies may not have hired or fired the workers directly, they exer3
cised considerable control over the conditions of employment.
The agencies set the number of hours the employee could work
and the tasks to be performed.34 The agencies also set the rate
and method of payment and maintained employment records.3"
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
See id.
Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1467.
Id.
Id. at 1468.
See id.
Id. at 1470.
Id.

33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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In Torres-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit again found a joint-employment relationship existed - this time, in a case involving contract farm workers' claims against produce growers for overtime
pay under both the FLSA and the AWPA." In Torres-Lopez, the
Ninth Circuit broadened its analysis of the joint employment issue by considering five factors listed in the AWPA, which overlapped with and expanded upon the four factors set forth in
Bonnette17 For example, instead of asking whether the employer
"supervised and controlled" the employee, the AWPA refers to
the "degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the work.""8 The
Torres-Lopez court also considered a longer list of eight factors set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Rutherford Food
Corp. v. McComb.' j Those factors include ownership of the
premises or equipment, transferability of the contracted work,
or of the workers, the longevity of the working relationship and
the integrity of the work performed to the employer's overall
business."' Taking all of those factors into account, the Ninth
Circuit held that a cucumber grower was ajoint employer of the
pickers hired by a contractor.4 Even though the grower exercised only indirect supervision over the pickers and did not hire
or pay them, the court found joint employment existed because
the economic reality of the situation showed that the grower exercised control over the pickers, who were "economically depen42
dent" on the grower.
Despite extensive references to both Bonnette and Torres-Lopez,
the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the joint employment issue in Air
France placed much greater weight on the more limited fourfactor test from Bonnette, as opposed to the broader tests cited in
Torres-Lopez. When the Court applied the four Bonnette factors to
the grounds crew workers and Air France, it held, without explanation, that the airline (1) lacked the ability to hire or fire the
workers, (2) did not determine rate or method of pay and (3)
did not keep employment records.4" The Court also found (4)
the "indirect supervision" of the grounds crews different from
the indirect supervision of the cucumber pickers from Torres-Lo'l Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 636-37 (9th Cir. 1997).
'17 See id. at 639-40.
Id. at 639-40 (emphasis added).
' Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
4)See id. at 730; see also Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 640; Air Fr., 365 F.3d at 951-52.
4 Torres-Lopez, 111 F. 3d at 644.
42 Id. at 642-44.
4, Air Fr., 356 F.3d at 950.
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pez." The court suggested that Air France's regular inspections
of the work performed differed from the cucumber grower's indirect supervision of the pickers because the airline's supervision was motivated by safety concerns.45 The court added that
Air France did not "control" the grounds crew because complaints were not given directly to the employees and were, in-

stead, given to the supervisors for each ground service
company.16 The court did not consider factors from Torres-Lopez, such as the longevity of the working relationship or the integrity of the work performed by the grounds crews to Air
France's overall business. The court ultimately held that "the
totality of the circumstances" pointed to a conclusion of no joint
employment, based on its borrowed analysis from FLSA cases.47
The Ninth Circuit employed faulty analysis in this opinion because it did not take the totality of the FMLA into consideration
when it borrowed analysis from case law on similar statutes. If
the Court had looked more carefully at the text of the FMLA, it
would have found distinctions in the law that could easily have
justified holding Air France responsible as the joint employer of
the grounds crew workers. Because no case law guides the
Ninth Circuit in the context of joint employment under the
FMLA, it should have first looked to the text of the statute involved before turning to case law from similar statutes for its
analysis. The Code of Federal Regulations explains how both
the FMLA and the FLSA should be carried out, and uses the
same language on joint employment, up to a point.48 In both
statutes, "where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers ...

a joint employment

relationship generally will be considered to exist."4 9 However,
the FMLA regulations go further and distinguish between "primary" and "secondary" joint employers, laying out the separate
responsibilities of each joint employer. 5' For example, the regulations state that "only the primary employer is responsible
for.., providing FMLA leave" and other benefits, while the secondary employer "is responsible for accepting the employee re44 Id. at 951.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.

48 29 C.F.R. § 825.106.
49 Id. §825.106(a); 29 U.S.C. §§203(d), (g) (1999).
50

29 C.F.R. §§ 825.106(c)-(e).

2005]

JOINT EMPLOYERS

573

turning from FMLA leave. ' - The regulations also state that
"[e]mployees jointly employed by two employers must be
counted by both employers, whether or not maintained on one
of the employer's payroll, in determining employer coverage
and employee eligibility. ' 5 2 Further, the regulations specifically
state that "factors considered in determining which is the 'primary' employer include authority/responsibility to hire and fire,
assign/place the employee, make payroll, and provide employment benefits. '5 3
These distinctions between primary and secondary joint employers do not exist in the FLSA regulations. Thus, following
the common rules of statutory interpretation, the distinctions
unique to the FMLA require unequivocal consideration when
evaluating joint employment relationships under the FMLA.
Otherwise, the regulatory language becomes mere surplusage.
If the Ninth Circuit had taken this language into account in its
analysis of Air France, it easily could have determined that
Moreau, an undisputed "primary" employee of Air France, qualified for medical leave because the airline had more than fifty
employees, as a "secondary" joint employer of the grounds crew
workers. In other words, Air France falls within the scope of the
FMLA only when the grounds workers are also counted, but
would have to provide leave only to primary employees like
Moreau, not to secondary employees like the grounds crew
workers.
Congress clearly anticipated situations like the one at hand
because it set forth separate responsibilities for primary and secondary employees in the FMLA. Those separate duties and descriptions for primary and secondary employers indicate that an
employer must provide medical leave only to its primary employees, but may only fall within the FMLA requirements when its
secondary employees are counted. According to the regulations, a joint employer has primary employees, whom it has the
"authority/responsibility to hire and fire, assign/place, and
make payroll. '54 Simultaneously, that same joint employer
could have secondary employees not maintained on its payroll,
whom it ostensibly would have no authority to hire, fire, assign
or place. 5 Thus, the Ninth Circuit should not have determined
51 Id. §§ 825.106(c), (e).
52 Id. § 825.106(d) (emphasis added).
3 Id.
§825.106(c).
54 See id.
55 ,See id.
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Air France's joint employment status based on its "ability to hire
or fire" grounds crew workers, its ability to "determine rate or
method of pay," or its practice of not keeping employment
records for those workers.56 Those factors are clearly laid out by
the FMLA regulations as determinative only of ajoint employer's
status as a primary employer. The court failed to consider the
possibility that a lower standard or threshold applies when determining whether an employer can be a joint, secondary
employer.
The FMLA regulations do not state what factors would make
an employer the joint, secondary employer of a group of workers. However, language describing the nature of joint employment common to both the FMLA and the FLSA encourages
interpreting joint employment broadly. Both statutes state that
ajoint-employment relationship may exist "where one employer
acts directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer in
relation to the employee.""7 Both also state that, "where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share
control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the
fact that one employer controls or is controlled by... the other
employer," a joint-employment relationship can also exist.58
Based on this broad definition of joint employment, it appears
that the court could easily have found that Air France was ajoint
employer of the grounds crew workers by virtue of its control
over the workers and their ground handling companies. The
grounds crew workers are clearly essential to Air France's business at the airport. They do work that simultaneously benefits
both employers. And Air France has, at the very least, shared
control over the cargo crew dedicated exclusively to them. Taking the totality of such circumstances into consideration, Air
France could easily qualify as a secondary employer to those
workers. The Ninth Circuit should have looked more closely at
the language of the FMLA when it considered this joint employment issue. Had it done so, it would likely have concluded that
Air France fell within the scope of the FMLA and should be required to provide its employees at the San Francisco Airport
medical leave under the Act.
56

57
58

Air Fr., 356 F.3d at 950.
29 C.F.R. § 825.106(a) (2); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b) (2)
29 C.F.R. § 825.106(a) (3); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b) (3)
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